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For many years, some computer software and other trade secret
owners have affixed a United States copyright notice upon their
copyrightable secret works. This practice is used to prevent forfeiture of federal copyright protection should the work be released to
the general public. In 1980, a committee of the American Bar Association's Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law1 reached
a consensus that there is no "conflict or inherent inconsistency in
placing a copyright notice on material which bears a confidentiality
'2
or secrecy admonition as to nondisclosure to third parties."
This Article will explore the impact of the supremacy clause of
the United States Constitution on copyright and trade secret protection when both are used simultaneously. While this Article analyzes the legal issues in the context of the computer software
industry, the developed principles are applicable generally to other
forms of copyrightable trade secrets. Once the interplay is ascertained, established principles of constitutional law will be applied to
a simple fact situation. It appears from an examination of the hypothetical that a trade secret misappropriation cause of action accruing subsequent to placement of a copyright notice conflicts with the
copyright laws' policies and objectives, and that, therefore, such a
conflict is unconstitutional under the supremacy clause.
I.

CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAW MUST
BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF FEDERAL LAW

The supremacy clause 3 states that federal law is the supreme
law of the land. Simply stated, a state law must yield whenever a
conflict develops between it and a federal law properly enacted by
1. ABA Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, Committee No. 402,
Trade Secrets and Interference with Contracts, subject 4, Use of Copyright Notice on
Confidential or Trade Secret Materials (1980).
2. ABA SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAw, 1980 PROCEEDINGS
AND COMMITTEE REPORTS 218 (1980). The 1981 successor committee has noted that

"the conflicting nature of trade secret and copyright theories seems to negate a conclusion that they may be relied on automatically and simultaneously." ABA SECTION
OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAw, 1981 PROCEEDINGS AND COMMITrEE RE-

PORTS 91, 93 (1981), (ABA Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, Committee No. 206, Trade Secrets and Interference with Contracts, subject 1, Reconciliation
of the Trade Secret/Copyright Conflict (1981)).
3. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
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Congress in an area of legislation delegated to it by the Constitu4
tion.
There are three subdivisions within the spectrum of federal regulation. At one end of the spectrum, Congress has left certain subjects totally unattended. That is, no federal regulation acts within
the subject area.5 At the opposite end of the spectrum, Congress
has occupied totally (preempted) the subject areas. 6 In the middle
of the spectrum, Congress permits state coregulation that does not
7
conflict with the operation of federal law.

Preemption is one form of conflict under the supremacy clause.
When Congress proclaims that its laws, and only its laws, shall operate in a particular field, any state coregulation would conflict with
such a federal declaration. Conversely, not all conflicts are preemption issues. Many federal laws allow the states to coregulate in certain areas of law, provided that the state regulations do not interfere
with the federal regulatory scheme.8 Since the purpose of this article is to examine the interplay between trade secret and copyright
law under the supremacy clause, only the preemption and coregulation segments of the federal regulation spectrum will be discussed. 9
A.

FORMATION OF THE PREEMPTION TEST AND ITS APPLICATION TO
TRADE SECRET AND COPYRIGHT COREGULATION

There are very few laws in which Congress makes an unambiguous statement concerning preemption.1 0 Courts must explore congressional intent to determine the extent to which there is
preemption. The United States Supreme Court developed a preemptive intent test in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp."
In Rice, the petitioner fied a complaint with the Illinois Commerce Commission that alleged violations of grain storage rate provisions and other regulations established by the Illinois Public
Utilities Act and the Illinois Grain Warehouse Act. Grain elevator
4. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIoNAL LAw § 6-23, at 376 (1978). See also Note,
The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalismand the Burger Court,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 624 (1975).
5. L. TRME, supra note 4, § 6-27, at 391.
6. Id. § 6-25, at 384.
7. .d. § 6-23, at 377; Note, supra note 4, at 624.
8. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1968) (federal firearms law are not to be construed as
indicating congressional intent to occupy the field of firearms regulation to the exclusion of state regulations unless there is a direct and positive conflict).
9. This analysis presumes that the only information disclosed under the trade
secret agreement is that contained within the copyrightable work.
10. L TIBE, supra note 4, § 6-25, at 386.
11. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
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operators commenced an action in federal district court to enjoin
the Commission from instituting rate proceedings. The operators
argued that such state regulations were preempted by the Federal
Warehouse Act. The District Court for the Northern District of linois dismissed the action 12 and the Seventh Circuit subsequently
13
reversed.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and held that the state regulations that were within the scope of the Federal Warehouse Act
were preempted. 14 The Court stated that the primary question on
the preemption issue was the intent of Congress. 15 If Congress expressly preempted the subject matter, any state regulation within
the field would be unconstitutional. If Congress was legislating in a
field that states traditionally occupied, there would be an initial "assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'1 6 The Court cited three factors that
would be weighed to determine an implied preemptive intent when
Congress does not manifest expressly its preemptive intent within a
federal statute:
(1) The pervasiveness of the federal regulation. A
highly pervasive federal regulatory scheme would imply
preemption.
(2) The dominance of the federal interest over the
state interest.
(3) The objectives of the federal regulation and
whether the state regulation would obstruct the full accom17
plishment of those aims.
Using these factors, one can determine whether Congress intended the Copyright Acts of 190918 and 197619 to preempt state law.
12. Unreported decision.
13. Board of Trade v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 156 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1946).
14. 331 U.S. at 236. Dismissal was affirmed for state regulations outside the scope
of the Federal Warehouse Act, such as requirements for prior state approval of certain types of contracts. Id. at 237.

15. 331 U.S. at 230.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 230-31. The Court has applied the Rice preemption intent test in subsequent supremacy clause controversies. See L. TRME, supra note 4, § 6-25, at 384-86
and cases cited therein.
18. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L No. 60-349, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 [hereinafter referred to as 1909 Act].
19. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-810 (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as 1976 Act]. The Copyright Act of 1976 be-
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1. Preemptive Intent Behind the 1909 Act
The Copyright Act of 1909 Act allowed coregulation of copyrightable works by common law and federal copyright. Federal preemp-

tion of common law copyright occurred only after publication
released a copyrightable work to the public domain. 20 Copyrightable works were protected only by federal copyright law once they
became public domain. 21 Federal copyright protection was secured
22
by publication with notice, pursuant to section 9 of the 1909 Act.
Clearly, the federal preemption mechanism under the 1909 Act was
publication. Since trade secrets by definition are not in the public

domain, Congress could not have intended to preempt state trade
secret protection absent publication. 23
came operative on January 1, 1978. It was amended recently by the Computer
Software Copyright Act of 1980, which was signed into law on December 12, 1980.
See Patent and Trademark Laws, Pub. L No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1980)). Section 10 reads as follows:
Sec. 10(a) Section 101 of title 17 of the United States Code is amended to
add at the end thereof the following new language: "A 'computer program' is
a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.".
(b) Section 117 of title 17 of the United States Code is amended to read
as follows:
"§ 117. Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement
for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
"(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
"(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only
and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued
possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
"Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this
section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy
from which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or
other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may
be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.".
There is no longer any doubt that computer programs are within the scope of federal
copyright protection.
20. 1909 Act, Pub. L No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1075. See also Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). Until January 1, 1978, when section 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976 became effective, it was hornbook law that publication divested
common law copyright. 1 M. NUIMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.02[C], at 4-14 (1980
ed.); Conner v. Mark I, Inc., No. 79-C-4469 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 18, 1981).
21. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Co., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). The broad dicta
of Compco has been narrowed. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973). See text
accompanying notes 70-71 infra.
22. 1909 Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075. See ILR. REP. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909), reprinted in 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 20, at 959 (1976 ed.).
23. Since preemption is only one end of the federal regulation spectrum, failure
to find congressional preemptive intent should not end the constitutional analysis.
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2. Preemptive Intent Behind the 1976 Act
Section 301(a) 24 of the 1976 Act preempts all legal or equitable
rights "equivalent" to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright. The exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright are specified in section 106.25 When the above sections are
read together with section 102,26 it appears that the 1976 Act was intended to preempt trade secret law.
Most trade secrets must be fixed in some form of tangible medium, and section 106 is broad enough to include within its scope all
forms of information transmission. Section 301(b) (3), however,
states that the 1976 Act does not annul or limit rights or remedies
with respect to rights not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
specified by section 106.27 Rights not equivalent to copyright are not
specified in section 301, but the legislative history of the 1976 Act
helps define what Congress thought were "equivalent" rights when
it enacted the provision.
The 1976 Act sought to eliminate the chaotic, common law copyright preemption mechanism of publication that existed under the
1909 Act. 28 The Register of Copyrights summarized the advantages
of a single uniform federal copyright system as first, elimination of
the publication dilemma; second, uniformity of protection from the
of the "limited
moment of fixation; and third, easier enforcement
29
times" requirement of the copyright clause.
Senate Bill S. 300830 proposed a preemption section 301 very
similar to the section 301 adopted in 1976. The Register stated in his
Supplementary Report that the then proposed section 301(b) was
intended to follow the Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 3 1 and
Where there is coregulation by the states and the federal government, the states'
laws may not conflict with federal law. See, e.g., note 8 and accompanying text supra.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). The exclusive rights include reproduction and distribution of copies, preparation of derivative works (e.g., object computer code from
source code), and public performance or display.
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). Section 102 states that copyright subsists in original
works of authorship fixed in tangible media of expression.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). The exclusive rights granted by section 106 that pertain
to writings include the right to reproduce and distribute copies, as well as the right to
prepare derivative works.
28. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw: 1965 REVISION BiL, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 82
(House Comm. Print 1965) (pt. 6) [hereinafter cited as SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT].
29. Id. at 82-83.
30. S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
31. 376 U.S. 225 (1964). See text accompanying notes 63-66 infra.
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Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Co. 32 decisions, which held that
preemption did not extend to unpublished subject matter or causes
of action outside the scope of the proposed act.3 Proposed section
301(b) (3) was not intended to annul or limit any state right or remedy concerning the unauthorized disclosure or exploitation of a
trade secret.34
Senator McClellan, in the 1974 Senate Judiciary Committee Report, stated that federal preemption of common law copyright was
intended to promote creative writing by providing a single uniform
system of protection for fixed works. 35 According to the Senator, it
was intended that "trade secrets and the general laws of defamation
and fraud would remain unaffected as long as the causes of action
contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights or a breach
of trust or confidentiality, that are different in kind from copyright
'36
infringement.
The Department of Justice did not approve of proposed section
301(b) (3) because it listed specific examples of rights not equivalent
to copyright. The department was fearful that state courts might
adopt anticompetitive doctrines contrary to copyright and antitrust
policies.37 The department cited InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press38 as an example of a much criticized, anticompetitive
39
case that was contrary to the great weight of authority.
The House and Senate Judiciary Committees ignored the department's disapproval, but the full House eliminated the list of examples of nonequivalent rights in its version of the bill upon a floor
32. 376 U.S. at 234.
33. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 28, at 84-85.
34. Id. at 85.
35. REPORT ON THE COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, S. REP. No. 93-983, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 164 (1974) (Senator McClellan).
36. Id. at 166. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1975) (identical language-final report of the Senate Judiciary Committee prior to passage of the 1976
Act); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1976) (identical language--final
recommendations of the House Judiciary Committee).
37. Milgrim, Trade Secrets, in 12 BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS § 2.06 [A] [3], at 2-72.14
n.67 (1980 ed.).

38. 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (states could prohibit misappropriation of facts that constituted "hot" news) [hereinafter referred to as INS doctrine].
39. Both letters omitted the fact that many courts had found the INS doctrine
persuasive, even in light of the Sears and Compco decisions, and the fact that the
Court has held that causes of action charging misappropriation of trade secrets were
not preempted by the patent laws. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470
(1974). See Diamond, Preemptionof State Law, reprintedin 2 Milgrim, Trade Secrets,

in 12A BusinEss ORGANIZATIONS app. B-i, at B1-8 (1980 ed.) (Sidney E. Diamond is a
former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks.)
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amendment by Congressman Seiberling.4 ° The House amendment
41
was adopted by the Senate and House Conference Committee.
Two notable commentators have studied the effect of the section
301(b)(3) deletions. Professor Nimmer suggests that the proposed
draft of section 301 prior to the Seiberling floor debate should be ignored. 42 He suggests that the section 301 preemption analysis
should focus on whether the state cause of action required any element other than the mere act of reproduction, distribution, performance, or display.43 Mr. Milgrim opines that the mere deletion of the
examples from the proposed draft, unaccompanied by any change in
the operative provisions of the statute, did not change the substantive effect of the section. 44 According to Mr. Milgrim, the limitations
of federal preemption established in section 301(b) (3) and the section's legislative history negate any express congressional preemptive intent.
The House Judiciary Committee Report, 45 accompanying the
Computer Software Copyright Act of 19804

amendments to the

Copyright Act of 1976, indicated that both the committee and the
Copyright Office believed that neither section 301 nor the amendments preempted state law protection such as unfair competition or
trade secrets. The one relevant paragraph in the report indicated
that the existence of copyright protection alone does not limit state
remedies. This statement presumably incorporates the earlier legislative history of the 1976 Act. That is, state remedies containing elements that are qualitatively different from those of federal copyright
protection are not preempted. 47 Nothing in the House Report indi40. 122 CONG. REC. H10910 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1976).
41. H.R. REP. No. 94-1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
42. 1 M. NBMvER, supra note 20, at § 1.01[B] [1], at 1-17 (1980 ed.).

43. Id.
44. Milgrim, supra note 37, § 2.061A] [31, at 2-72.14 n.67.
45. H.R. REP. No. 96-1307(I), 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 23-24. No Senate Report was submitted with this legislation.
46. See note 19 supra.
47. Recent court decisions have narrowly construed section 301(b)(3). Courts
must be satisfied that the state cause of action protects substantive rights differing
from mere reproduction, distribution, performance, or display, which are protected by

section 106. Misappropriation of a published work is one example of a cause of action
equivalent to those of section 106. See Mitchell v. Penton/Indus. Publishing Co., 486
F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 1979).

State causes of action that have been held to differ from federal copyright protection include the right to exploit commercial publicity (Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts,
Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (exploitation of a "persona" creates a separate
intangible property right)), deceptive trade practices (John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke
Checks, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 664 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (public confusion or deception

required to sustain the cause of action)), unfair competition (D.C. Comics, Inc. v.

1981]

FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW SUPREMACY

27

cates that Congress has ever considered possible impairment of the
federal copyright system by its simultaneous use with trade secret
protection.
Applying the preemptive intent factors established in Rice to
Filmation Assoc., 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (proof of public confusion and
misappropriation of economic value required)), breach of confidential relations (D.C.
Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assoc., 486 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), and state trade regulation (Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. Ohio 1980)
(Ohio regulation prohibiting blind bid movie licensing held not equivalent to section
106 rights)). Cf. Stout Realty, Inc. v. Country 22 Real Estate Corp., 493 F. Supp. 997
(W.D. Mo. 1980) (claims for conversion and misappropriation of a copyrightable secret business manual dismissed for failure to properly plead diversity jurisdiction).
Courts also will stress substance over form in the pleadings. State law based
claims will be dismissed if the pleaded facts are substantively equivalent to those of a
federal copyright claim. Claim or element labels alone are irrelevant. The Second
Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of defendant's counterclaim for unfair competition. See Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980). There was
no substantial similarity in the packaging of the toys in controversy that would lead
to a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source of the goods. Id. at 918. The
court held that the defendant could not use an unfair competition claim to protect itself from a copying of the toys themselves. Id. at 919.
Practitioners should plead the elements of a trade secret cause of action with
care. See Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, [1981] COPYRIGHT L REP. (CCH) 25,207
(M.D. Ala., Sept. 4, 1980). Avco alleged in its complaint that the defendant obtained
and improperly used its proprietary drawings and specifications. The court, dismissing the claim, held that it was equivalent to an allegation that the drawings were
copied, and mere copying of drawings was within the scope of the copyright law. In
light of Avco, practitioners should plead elements such as invasion of privacy, trespass, or breach of confidentiality if they want to avoid dismissal of trade secret
claims.
Practitioners should also heed the opinion recently handed down by the Southern District of New York. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,
501 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The plaintiff publishers had entered into an agreement with former President Ford to publish the latter's memoirs. The plaintiffs also
had licensed Time, Inc., to publish exclusive excerpts of the memoirs in advance of
the planned book release. Defendants somehow had obtained a copy of the memoirs
manuscript and published excerpts without authorization from the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs commenced an action for copyright infringement and conversion, among
other things. The essence of the conversion claim was that the defendants obtained
and copied portions of the memoirs that caused the plaintiffs to lose profits from the
Time, Inc., license. Id. at 852. They did not claim the loss of physical possession of a
copy of the unpublished manuscript-a traditional type of conversion claim. The
claim was held equivalent to the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute a copyrightable work, and was thus preempted by section 301.
Elements in the pleadings that differ from those of copyright must create a cognizable common law cause of action. See Suid v. Newsweek Magazine, 503 F. Supp. 146
(D.D.C. 1980). In Suid, the plaintiff alleged copyright infringement and a claim of unfair competition for failure to attribute his authorship of the allegedly infringed
quotes. The court held that there was no infringement and also dismissed the unfair
competition claim. Failure to attribute authorship was held not to be a cognizable
common law claim for which relief could be granted.
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section 301,4 one finds that the 1976 Act is a highly pervasive law.
Any writing is protected after fixation into a tangible medium. 49
The 1976 Act, however, does not protect confidential relations or the
property interest inherent in trade secret agreements. Thus, the
first implied intent factor of pervasiveness is not satisfied.
According to the House, 50 Senate5 l and McClellan5 2 reports on
the copyright revision, the fundamental purpose behind the 1976 Act
was to create a uniform system of copyright protection. Neither the
reports nor the statute indicate any federal interest in a system of
trade secret regulation. Thus, the second implied intent factor, the
dominance of the federal interest, is also not satisfied.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.5 3 held that trade secret protection did not unduly encroach upon patent law disclosure objectives
because few owners would prefer the weaker state trade secret protection over stronger federal protection.M Congress also had disclosure objectives when it passed the deposit requirements5 5 of the
190956 and 197657 Acts. Since trade secret protection, in and of itself,
does not obstruct the disclosure objectives of copyright law, the
third implied congressional intent factor is not satisfied.
Application of the Rice preemption test to overlapping federal
copyright and state trade secret protection shows that Congress has
not manifested either an express or implied intent to occupy totally
the field of protection for writings. States are free to coregulate in
the field of protection for writings so long as the state laws do not
obstruct the full execution and purposes of the copyright law. The
issue within this segment of the federal intellectual property regulation spectrum is whether simultaneous use of both copyright and
trade secret protection creates an unconstitutional obstruction.

B. FORMATION OF THE CONFLICT TEST AND ITS APPLICATION TO
COPYRIGHT POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

The Court applied a supremacy clause conflict test to coregula48.
49.
50.
51.

See text accompanying note 17 supra.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975).

52. See note 35 supra.
53. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
54. Id. at 490-91.
55. Dunne, Deposit of Copyrighted Works,

1 STUDIES

ON COPYRIGHT 409, 444 (Ar-

thur Fisher mem. ed. 1963); Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 4950 (1936) (Black, J., dissenting).
56. 1909 Act, Pub. L, No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
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tion in the area of alien registration in Hines v. Davidowitz. 8 Pennsylvania's alien registration law was held to conflict unconstitutionally with federal registration laws. It was held that any
state law that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" unconstitutionally conflicts with federal law.5 9
The Hines test was refined in subsequent cases. In Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,60 the conflict analysis focused on the potential impairment of federal supremacy in the conflicting field, not merely on whether both bodies of law were aimed
at similar or different objectives. Perez v. Campbell 61 further required that the conflicting state law not frustrate any of the effectiveness of the federal law. "Even where extensive federal
regulatory schemes have been enacted, if there is no express Conallowed to act
gressional language of preemption, states have been
6' 2
in the interstices of the federal regulatory matrix.
Five United States Supreme Court decisions have established
the parameters of permissible state regulation within the spectrum
of federal intellectual property regulation. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co. 63 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Co.64 concerned state unfair competition protection for articles of manufacture (lamps) whose patents were declared invalid. All of the unique
features of these lamps were in the public domain because they
were clearly discernible by inspection of publicly available goods.
The Court held in both cases that the states could not prevent copying of goods in the public domain. 65 In Sears, the Court stated that
58. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
59. Id. at 67-68. The establishment of factors that would constitute an "obstacle"
would not occur until the subsequent Kewanee opinion. See text accompanying
notes 76-111 infra.
60. 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (California regulation of the fat content of avocados did not
impair federal avocado grading standards).
61. 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (state law attaching driver's license until payment of auto
accident judgment held to conflict with federal bankruptcy laws).
62. Mariniello v. Shell Oil Co., 511 F.2d 853, 857 (3d Cir. 1975). State regulation of
franchise termination was not preempted by Lanham Act provisions concerning the
right of trademark owners to license their works. The Third Circuit ruled that Congress did not intend to totally regulate franchisei under the Lanham Act; therefore,
states were free to coregulate absent a conflict with federal laws.
63. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
64. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
65. Similarly, in Wheaton v. Peters, the Court held that federal copyright could
not subsist in judicial opinions. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). Subsequent cases ex-

panded the doctrine to include statutory material. See, e.g., Building Officials & Code
Adm. v. Code Technology, Inc., 628 F.2d 730 (1st Cir. 1980) and cases cited therein.
Building officials reversed the entering of a preliminary injunction against the pub-
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Congress, within the federal patent system, had drawn a delicate
balance between rewarding inventors and free competition; state
protection of public domain goods would upset and, therefore, con66
flict with that balance.
The common law doctrine of licensee estoppel was held to conflict with patent policy in Lear, Inc. v. Adkin. 67 Lear had hired Adkins to develop improvements in aircraft gyroscopes. The parties
had agreed that Adkins would retain a property interest in all ideas
or inventions and license them to Lear. Lear did not pay royalties
for the period prior to and after patent issuance, whereupon Adkins
sued on the contract in California state court. One of Lear's defenses was patent invalidity. The California Supreme Court held
that Lear was estopped from asserting an invalidity defense. The
68
Court reversed and remanded on the question of licensee estoppe
but refused to address whether state enforcement of trade secret
contracts for royalties prior to issuance of Adkin's patent would con69
flict with federal patent policy.
Convicted record pirates challenged the constitutionality of a
California criminal statute in Goldstein v. California.70 They argued
that Sears and Compco prohibited state protection of phonorecordings because the copyright clause 7 ' vested copyright powers relating
to published works solely in the federal government. It was argued
that if state coregulation was constitutional, then the California regulation unconstitutionally interfered with federal copyright policy.
Alternatively, the distribution of phonorecordings "published" the
works within the meaning of the 1909 Act such that protection by
California was preempted.
The Court held that the California record piracy statute was
valid. Citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens,72 the Court held that the
copyright clause did not vest the federal government with exclusive
power to regulate copyrights, nor need there be a uniform national
lishers of unofficial copies of administrative regulations. In dicta, the court strongly
implied that it would extend the Wheaton v. Peters doctrine to administrative agency
regulations and codes. It reasoned that the public must have free access to its own
laws. Id. at 734.
66. 376 U.S. at 231.

67. 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 675. This issue was addressed later by the Court. See Aronson v. Quick
Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (state enforcement of contracts that provide for
royalties as consideration for the disclosure of unpatentable trade secrets does not

conflict with patent policies).
70. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
72. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318-19 (1851).
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legislative system. 73 California's protection of publicly available
phonorecordings neither conflicted with nor was preempted by federal copyright law. The legislative history of the 1909 Act manifested
congressional intent to keep phonorecordings outside the federal domain of regulation. 74 In other words, phonorecordings were in the
unattended segment of the federal regulation spectrum, and state
regulation in this segment does not conflict with federal regulation.
"In regard to this category of 'Writings,' [phonorecordings] Congress has drawn no balance; rather, it has left the area unattended,
'75
and no reason exists why the State should not be free to act.
1. Kewanee Conflict Test
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 7 6 established a practical
supremacy clause test applicable to diverse conflict disputes. It provided a series of detailed balancing factors similar to the preemption
factors in Rice .77
One of petitioner Kewanee's chemical divisions had perfected a
unique crystal growth process. The company chose to keep its process a trade secret rather than to pursue its patent rights. Patent eligibility expired one year after public use of the crystals. 78 To
protect its secret, the petitioner executed confidentiality and nonuse
agreements with its employees as a condition of employment. An
action was commenced against the respondents, former employees
and the competing corporation that they founded, for misappropria79
tion of trade secrets. The federal district court found for Kewanee,
but the Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that enforcement of state
trade secret protection would conflict with the patent policy behind
73. 412 U.S. at 553, 558.

74. The Court examined the legislative history of all previous federal copyright
laws and took judicial notice of the state of technology at the turn of the twentieth
century. Prior legislative history indicated that copyrightable subject matter expanded with new forms of commercial technology. Musical compositions were not

protected by federal law until 1831. Composers were later granted the right to receive
royalties from player piano rolls in 1909. 412 U.S. at 564-65, (citing H. R. REP. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909) and the then-contemporary decision of White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (piano rolls are mere machine components)). Congress only later extended copyright protection to recordings. See Act
of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1(f), 5(n), 19, 20, 26,
101(e)) (federal protection extended to phonorecordings).
75. 412 U.S. at 570. See also Leonard Storch Enterprises, Inc. v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 623 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (film fonts not within the scope of
federal copyright law protection could be protected by state law).
76. 416 U.S. 470 (1974).

77. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1972).

79. Unreported decision.
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section 102(b). 80
Reversing, the Court held that the law of trade secrets was not
preempted by the United States patent laws.8 1 First, citing Goldstein, the Court concluded that the patent and copyright clause did
not vest Congress with exclusive legislative powers over discoveries.8 2 The claim that trade secret law unconstitutionally conflicted
with federal patent law then was resolved by a two-step analytical
test.
Step one of the test was to determine if there was a direct clash
between federal and state objectives. If there was such a clash, then
the state law had to fall.8 3 Applying the basic conflict principles of
Hines8 4 and Florida Growers,8" the Court asked whether trade secret law stood "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. '8 6 The objective of
the patent laws was to promote the progress of science and the useful arts by offering a reward for invention (a seventeen-year right of
exclusion) in return for disclosure of the invention.8 7 The objectives
of trade secret law were to maintain the "standards of commercial
88
ethics" and to encourage invention.
Citing Goldstein,8 9 Sears,90 Compco,9 1 and International News
Service v. Associated Press,92 the Court found that federal and state
objectives would clash if the states attempted to protect ideas and
works in the public domain. Works in the public domain were only
protected by the federal patent system (and by implication from the
Goldstein case, the federal copyright system). 93 Trade secrets, by
definition, are not in the public domain; therefore, trade secret law
would not protect works in the public domain.9 4 Since the Court
found no direct clash between trade secret law and the patent system, it proceeded to step two of the test.
Step two was to determine if interaction between state trade se80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

478 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1973).
416 U.S. at 474 (1974).
Id. at 478.
Id. at 480 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. at 231).
See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
See text accompanying note 60 supra.
416 U.S. at 479.
Id. at 480.
Id. at 481.
See text accompanying notes 70-75 supra.
See text accompanying notes 63-66 supra.
Id.
248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
416 U.S. at 481.
Id. at 484.
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cret law and the patent system would constitute "too great an encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated. 9 5 This
was the crux of the supremacy clause conflict issue. The Court enumerated several factors that would help to resolve the issue. 96 Next,
the Court focused on nonpatentable subject matter, that is, works of
97
the type that Congress chose not to regulate. Citing Goldstein, it
held that states were free to regulate in areas that are unattended
by the federal patent laws.98
The most difficult encroachment analysis in Kewanee concerned
material in the federal domain, that is, subject matter regulated by
the patent law that is not patented. 99 Owners of trade secrets concerning patentable subject matter have either chosen to forego patent protection or, alternatively, have failed to comply with the
substantive or procedural rules of the patent laws. The federal law's
quid pro quo for protection is disclosure of the invention. Trade secret laws protect the same material without disclosure. This disclosure conflict required a close examination by the Court.
Chief Justice Burger, author of the opinion, noted that the "patent policy of encouraging invention [was] ... not disturbed by the
existence of another form of incentive to invention." 1° ° The Chief
Justice concluded that there was no excessive encroachment of the
patent disclosure objective. The factors that influenced encroachment were the rigor of the state protection and the likelihood of diversion from use of the federal patent system to state trade secret
protection. 10 '
All trade secrets within the federal domain could be placed into
three categories: (1) trade secrets believed to be unpatentable due
to substantive or procedural defects; (2) trade secrets of dubious
10 2
patentability; and (3) trade secrets believed to be patentable.
The Court noted that abolition of trade secret protection for unpat95. Id. at 482 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. at 232).
96. See Mann, Copyright Law Revision and the Kewanee Preemption Issue: Is
There a Doctrine in the House?, 16 SANTA CLARA L REV. 609 (1975).
97. 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973).
98. 416 U.S. at 483.
99. Federal patent law establishes four express categories of patentable subject
matter-processes, machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions of matter. 35

U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
100. 416 U.S. at 484.
101. Professor Goldstein has suggested that the Kewanee conflict test is applicable equally to the trade secret-copyright disclosure conflict. Goldstein, Preempted
State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing the Limits
of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L REV. 1107, 1122-23 (1977).
102. 416 U.S. at 484 (citing Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir.
1971)).
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entable or dubiously patentable inventions would flood the Patent
Office with applications. Those applications that were rejected
would never be disclosed to the public. 10 3 Some dubiously patentable inventions might incorrectly receive patent protection that was
"likely to have deleterious effects on society.. . [and was not] balanced out by the speculative gain which might result from the encouragement of some inventors with doubtfully patentable
inventions which deserve patent protection to come forward and apply for patents. 1° 4 The Court also found positive social benefits
from trade secret protection of unpatentable and dubiously patentable inventions. Inventors are encouraged thereby to share their secret knowledge with others, by having the assurance of legal
protection against breaches of confidence. 10 5
The third category--clearly patentable inventions for which the
owner chose to use trade secret rather than patent protection-was
the most constitutionally troublesome category. "[T]he federal interest in disclosure [of clearly patentable inventions] is at its peak
....
,I06 Here the Kewanee opinion issues a strong caveat to the
states not to divert owners from use of the federal system.
If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a substantial risk that holders of patentable inventions would not seek patents, but rather would rely on the state protection, we would be
compelled to hold
that such a system could not constitutionally
10 7
continue to exist.
The two factors listed by the Court, likelihood of diversion and
the rigor of state protection, are closely related. The Court noted
that trade secret laws provide for weaker protection than patent law.
The federal patent system provides an absolute barrier against unconsented use of the invention for seventeen years, whereas the
state system does not protect the secret from use by those who discovered it by reverse engineering or independent creation. Thus,
the Court concluded that few inventors would forfeit their right to
patent protection under section 102(b) for the weaker state protection.108
The Court found further that technological progress would not
be impeded by the rare inventor who chose trade secret protection.
It realistically noted that other inventors probably would discover
103. 416 U.S. at 485. All abandoned patent applications held by the Patent and
Trademark Office remain-cunldential. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1975).
104. 416 U.S. at 489.
105. Id. at 486 (citing Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 233 (2d Cir. 1971)).
106. 416 U.S. at 489.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 489-91.

19811

FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW SUPREMACY

Is the item in the:
unattended domain?

YES

NO
YES

federal domain?
NO
public domain?
(trade secret law does not
protect items in the public domain)
YES

Is state protection:
as rigorous as federal
protection?

NO
_!
The state law is
unconstitutional
by operation of
the supremacy clause.

YES

likely to divert use
from the federal system?
I
NO

'I

The state law does not excessively
conflict with the federal law.
FIGURE 1:

SUMMARY OF THE KEWANEE CONFLICT TEST

the same invention within a relatively short period of time. "If the
invention, though still a trade secret, is put into public use, the competition is alerted to the existence of the inventor's solution to the
problem and may be encouraged to make an extra effort to independently find the solution thus known to be possible."10 9 In the
absence of diversion from the federal system due to less rigorous
state protection, the Court reasoned that trade secret protection of
patentable inventions did not frustrate federal policy.' 10
The supremacy clause conflict test as developed in the courts
can now be applied to the issue of simultaneous use of trade secret
and federal copyright protection. As in Kewanee, the congressional
policies and objectives behind copyright law must be determined.
109. Id. at 491.
110. Id. at 490-91.
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This conflict problem is squarely within the federal domain of protection, since all of the secret ideas and expressions were disclosed
in a copyrightable writing that was not released to the general pub111
lic.
2. 1909 Act: Policies and Objectives
Two congressional reports concerning the proposed 1909 Act
were produced by the Sixtieth Congress. 112 Congress was concerned with promotion of the arts and sciences, and specifically with
the balance between the conflicting goal of rewarding authors in order to encourage new writings versus the public detriment arising
1 13
from the grant of monopolistic powers.
In order to understand the 1909 Act copyright mechanism, it is
helpful to compare it to the previous mechanism. Prior to the 1909
Act, registration and deposit of a work were conditions precedent to
the creation and perfection of a copyright claim. An author had to
create and perfect his copyright claim prior to publication. Publication without a valid copyright dedicated the work to the public and
forfeited the author's right to federal protection. 114 To mitigate the
harsh forfeiture rules, the 1909 Act departed from registration and
deposit as preconditions to copyright. 115 A copyright was obtained
by publication with notice of copyright. 116 Registration and deposit
became conditions subsequent that perfected the copyright claim. 117
The fact that deposit and registration became conditions subsequent to federal protection does not mean that Congress considered
111. Skeptics will argue that ideas that were expressed in the writing are not protected by federal copyright law; hence, they are really in the domain unattended by
federal law. This argument is addressed later in this Article. See text accompanying
notes 146-54 infra.
112. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) (hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
t2222), reprinted in 2 M. NUMER, supra note 20, at 949 (1976 ed.); S. REP. No. 1108, 60th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) (language identical to the House Report) (hereinafter only the

House Report will be cited).
113. H.R. REP. No. 2222, note 112 supra; 2 M. NImMiz,

supra note 20, at 967 (1976

ed.).

114. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 46-47 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
115. 1909 Act, Pub. L No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075.
116. Id. At the time, Congress probably did not realize that they were opening a
Pandora's box. Precisely how much publication was necessary to invest federal copyright became a hotly litigated issue. See generally 1 M. NxMMER, supra note 20, § 4.13
[C], at 4-70 to 4-73 (1980 ed.). Congress eliminated the chaotic publication copyright

investment mechanism in the 1976 Act. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
117. H.R. REP. No. 2222, supra note 112; 2 M. NIMiER, supra note 20, at 972 (1976
ed.).
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them mere bureaucratic trivialities. When other sections of the 1909
Act are read concurrently with section 9, it becomes clear that
registration and deposit were an important quid pro quo to federal
copyright protection. First, section 7118 prohibited copyright of
works already in the public domain. Once a work was disclosed to
the general public, federal protection no longer was available. Second, section 12119 required prompt deposit of copies in the Copyright
Office after publication with copyright notice. No infringement action could be maintained without proper deposit. The Register of
Copyrights could demand deposit if the owner failed to do so. The
failure to deposit after the Register so demanded voided the copy120
right claim and resulted in a fine.
Clearly the quid pro quo of federal protection was deposit. The
deposit objectives provide a key to the goals and policies of the federal copyright system. Congressional deposit objectives under the
1909 Act were to memorialize and identify works for which copyright
was claimed and to preserve worthy works for the diffusion of public
12 1
knowledge.
The Sears, Compco, and Goldstein holdings established that the
public is free to copy works of copyrightable subject matter that are
publicly available (in the public domain) unless they are protected
by federal copyright law. If works did not indicate protected or free
status, potential copiers would have to inspect the copyright registration records to avoid public infringement. Few people would
have the inclination to check registration records and, thus, they
would not copy the work. There would be an overall chill on the
free and efficient dissemination of public domain information that
the public might otherwise be entitled to copy or transmit. Congress adopted notice provisions to avoid the chill on dissemination.
Copyright notice played an instrumental part in identification of
claimed works. As one of the Copyright Office studies noted,
"[u Inder the present [1909 Act] system the notice is not a mere representation of an existing fact, but is an assertion of the claimant
122
If
that he is entitled to, and does claim copyright in his work."'
118. 1909 Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1075.
119. Id. at § 12.
120. Id. at § 13.
121. Dunne, supra note 55, at 444. REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (House
Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as REGISTER's REPORT]. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 49-50 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). 2 M. NMMER,
fupra note 20, § 7.171A], at 7-128 (1980) (deposit builds the Library of Congress collection).
122. Berger, False Use of Copyright Notice, 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 297, 300 (Ar-
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owners placed copyright notice on works when they were not entitled to do so, or were not in fact claiming protection, public copying
would be chilled unreasonably. Congress did not want the purposes
behind copyright notice subverted by dishonest owners. To prevent
this subversion, the 1909 Act, like previous acts, established criminal
12 3
penalties for false notice.
Under prior copyright acts, the false notice offense would have
constituted mere notice affixation upon unregistered works. Notice
affixation was prohibited until the unpublished work was registered
and copyright was awarded. The element of a false notice violation
changed under the 1909 Act. Fraudulent intent became an essential
element. Notice became an assertion that the claimant believed that
he was entitled to copyright and did so claim by insertion of no12 4
tice.
Professor Nimmer has suggested that section 7 of the 1909 Act
was only violated by placement of copyright notice upon works in
the public domain 125 or upon unpublished works owned by another.126 They constitute the actus reus element of the criminal violation, but Nimmer has avoided the mens rea element-fraudulent
intent. If one follows the Berger interpretation of the Congressional
intent behind copyright notice, placement of notice without the intent to comply with federal deposit and registration requirements
also would violate section 105.127
In conclusion, the congressional policy behind federal copyright
under the 1909 Act was to grant federal protection to owners who
were willing to deposit their works for public disclosure. Congress
thur Fisher mem. ed. 1963). Accord, Technicon Med. Information Sys. Corp. v. Green
Bay Packaging, Inc., [1981) COPYRIGHT L REP. (CCH)
25,255, at 16,466 (E.D. Wis.,
Sept. 9, 1980) appeal docketed, No. 81-1469 (7th Cir., Mar. 6, 1981) (citing Goodis v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 403 (2d Cir. 1970) (principal purpose of
copyright notice is to inform the public that copyright is claimed)).
123. 1909 Act, Pub. L No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 17, 35 Stat. 1075.
124. Berger, spra note 122, at 300.
125. No federal protection was available for works already in general circulation.
1909 Act, Pub. L No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1075.
126. 2 M. NnmmER, supra note 20, § 163, at 709 (1976 ed.).
127. Neither Professor Nimmer's treatise nor Mr. Berger's study cited false notice
cases under the 1909 Act, but one recent case stated that the principal purpose of
copyright notice is to inform the public that copyright is claimed. Technicon Med. Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, Inc., [1981] COPYRIGHT L REP. (CCH)
25,255, at 16,466 (E.D. Wis., Sept. 9, 1980), appeal docketed, No. 81-1469 (7th Cir., Mar.
6, 1981). It follows that placement of copyright notice without intent to register and
deposit the work violates the false notice provisions, or at least (as in Technicon) estops the claimant from asserting a cause of action inconsistent with the inherent
message of copyright notice.
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could not have intended to have copyright notice used by authors
who were not willing to uphold their part of the federal bargain.
3.

1976 Act: Policies and Objectives

In contrast to the few reports that accompanied the 1909 Copyright Act, the 1976 Act generated a large number of reports and studies. The first serious congressional action to revise the 1909 Act
occurred in the mid-1950s when it became apparent that new technologies such as xerography, cable television, sound recordings, and
computer storage systems were not addressed adequately by the
current copyright laws. Congress solicited two revision reports and
thirty-four studies from the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress. 128 The reports and studies identified the inadequacies of the
1909 Act and recommended legislative solutions. Congress subsequently incorporated some of the suggested solutions into the 1976
129
Act.
As in the 1909 Act, the deposit objectives of Congress were to
memorialize and identify works for which copyright was claimed
and to preserve worthy works for the diffusion of public knowledge.
130
As in the 1909 Act, the 1976 Act requires deposit and registration.
Both the Senate 13 1 and House 132 reports stressed that deposit was
mandatory. The Register of Copyright's report stated that deposit
enriches the Library of Congress, which in turn discloses the contents of the work to the public and identifies the work for which
copyright is claimed.133 In the Supplementary Report, the Register
concluded that, in general, deposit would be induced if the statute
made it, along with registration, prerequisites to the initiation of an
infringement action. 134
128. The studies were bound in one reference source. STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT (Arthur Fisher mem. ed. 1963). Two reports were prepared by the Register of Copyrights. They are mostly condensations of the separate studies, but they also contain
commentaries on proposed copyright legislation. REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 121;
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 28.
129. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1976) (preempting common law copyright from the
moment of fixation of a work into a tangible medium of expression).

130. Id. §§ 407, 408.
131. S. REP. No. 94-473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1975).
132. H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 150 (1976).
133. REGISTER'S REPORT, supra note 121, at 77.
134. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 28, at 125. Voluntary deposit as a prerequisite to copyright infringement actions has a more important role under the 1976 Act
than under the previous Act. Under the 1909 Act, failure to deposit after demand by
the Register could void the copyright. The 1976 Act contains no such strong administrative sting. The Register is authorized to levy a small fine up to $250 and to charge
the recalcitrant owner for the acquisition price of the works. Repeated offenders may
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As in prior acts, notice must be affixed to works.1 35 Notice is an
136
effective way to inform the public that a claim on a work exists.
This approach also places a substantial body of work in the public
domain on which owners are not interested in obtaining copyright. 137 Members of the public know that they may copy works not
138
bearing notice.
Unlike prior acts, the notice requirements under the 1976 Act
are not absolute. Section 405(a) 139 prevents copyright forfeiture if
notice is omitted from publicly distributed copies under three defined circumstances. 14 0 The five year relation back provision of Section 405(a) (2) is the broadest of those defined circumstances
because it prevents absolute free use of public domain work for a
141
period of five years from distribution without notice.
be fined $2,500. 17 U.S.C. § 407(d) (1976). The section 407 administrative remedies are
designed to compensate the Library of Congress for acquisition costs. Restricted access to federal courts conditioned upon registration and deposit is the real protector
of Congressional deposit policy under the 1976 Act.
Voluntary deposit will not be induced under the 1976 Act if owners are permitted
to use state trade secret protection simultaneously and thereby avoid the need to use
federal court protection as a first resort. Deposit could be avoided unless the secrecy
of the work was lost and federal copyright protection for the now public domain work
became necessary. This subversion of federal policy by state law was what the
supremacy clause, as interpreted by the Kewanee court, was designed to prevent.
See text accompanying notes 76-111 supra.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
136. S. REP. No. 94-473, supra note 131, at 126; H. R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note
132, at 143; see also Doyle, Notice of Copyright, 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHr 236, 273 (Arthur Fisher mem. ed. 1963).
137. Doyle, supra note 136, at 238.
138. Innocent infringers who rely on lack of copyright notice incur no liability for
actual or statutory damages for infringing acts occurring prior to the receipt of actual
notice. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976)
139. Id. § 405(a).
140. Omission is excused if relatively few copies were distributed (§ 405(a) (1)), or
if in violation of an express written requirement that authorized copies be distributed
with notice (Q405(a) (3)). The most liberal departure from the traditional forfeiture
rule is contained in section 405(a) (2), also known as the five year relation back provision. Under the relation back provision the omission on any number of copies is excused provided that the owner registers the work within five years after distribution
without notice and a reasonable effort is made to add notice to copies distributed after discovery of the omission. The relation back provision effectively delays public
forfeiture for five years.
141. See note 140 supra. The House and Senate Committee reports state that the
intent behind section 405(a)(2) was to delay copyright forfeiture for at least five
years, whether notice omission was intentional or deliberate. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,
supra note 132, at 147; S. REP. No. 94-473, supra note 131, at 129. While the committees may have intended the provision to apply to deliberate omissions of notice, such
an intent is contrary to the clear statutory requirement for a reasonable attempt to
affix notice to all distributed copies after discovery of the omission.
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Under section 405(b), the public has a qualified privilege to copy
non-notice bearing works without fear of infringement damages if
the infringement was "innocent," and an absolute privilege starting
five years after first distribution. Innocent infringers are defined in
the provision as persons who rely upon the lack of copyright notice
as an indication that the work is free from copyright protection. The
burden of proof is on the innocent infringer to prove his reliance
and the lack of notice. Therefore, actual notice of federal copyright
protection would negate the defense. Similarly, a printed notice on
the work that the owner is reserving his right to use federal protection might also negate the defense. 142
As in previous copyright laws, the 1976 Act has a fraudulent notice provision. 143 Given the serious purposes behind the copyright
notice requirement, it seems incomprehensible that Congress would
want the delicate balance between free competition and reward to
writers upset by indiscriminate use of copyright notice unless authors intended to comply with the deposit and registration requirements of the 1976 Act.
II. APPLICATION OF THE CONFLICT TEST TO TRADE
SECRET AND COPYRIGHT COREGULATION
Both the 1909 and 1976 Acts have similar disclosure and notice
objectives. One is to encourage the creation and disclosure of new
works by offering federal protection against unauthorized copying.
Disclosure is to be insured by registration and deposit. Second, free
dissemination of works is protected by the notice requirements.
Prior to January 1, 1978, circulated works not bearing notice could be
freely copied, 1' and after that date innocent infringers would not be
liable for5 damages that resulted from infringement prior to actual
14
notice.
The Kewanee conflict test can now be applied to a hypothetical
fact situation. Assume that the owner/licensor of a copyrightable,
but secret, computer program affixed a copyright notice to the program but did not deposit or register it with the United States Copyright Office. He disclosed the contents of the program only to
licensees who executed confidentiality and limited use agreements.
142. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976).
143. Id. § 506(c). This provision is similar to those of the 1909 Act. See 1909 Act,
Pub. L No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 17, 35 Stat. 1075. There is no discussion of congressional

intent concerning false notice in any of the Senate or House reports; one may presume, therefore, that Congress intended to follow traditions established by the prior
acts.
144. 1909 Act, Pub. L No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1075.
145. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976).
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Nothing but the contents of the above program was disclosed. Assume that no one except the owner/licensor and the licensees are
aware of the work. Also assume that the entire set of facts above
occurred before and after January 1, 1978, so that the analysis may
include both the 1909 and 1976 Acts. Lastly, assume that the owner
then instituted a misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action
against one of the licensees.
A.

TRADE SECRET PROTECTION OVERLAPS COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

When viewed from a broad perspective, trade secret and copyright law protect different subgroups of intellectual property. In
general, copyright law protects forms of expressions, whereas trade
secret law protects ideas.146 Conflict would be an impossibility if
there were a sharp line of demarcation between the two subgroups. 147 There is, however, no sharp line of demarcation between
the two subgroups of protection, but, instead, a wide zone of overlap.
Copyright and trade secret law can protect the same material.
The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as any formula pattern, device, or compilation, 148 and a recent federal case defined an
owner's trade secret as the precise configuration, juxtaposition, and
assemblage of components in a machine. 14 9 Professor Nimmer,
when discussing the constitutional aspects of copyright preemption
in his treatise, noted that the Copyright Act of 1976 did not "extend
'150
protection to ideas distinguishedfrom their expression.
Trade secrets can comprise ideas and expressions. Within this
zone of overlap, trade secret law can coregulate with federal protection if the expression is of a form protected by copyright law. In the
hypothetical fact situation the entire trade secret was the contents
of a computer program. 15 1 Thus, this analysis concerns state coregulation of that which is squarely within the domain of federal protection.
Kewanee 152 clearly held that state trade secret protection and
146. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976); Milgrim, supra note 37, § 2.06 A[31, at 2-72.14 n.67.
147. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (conflict found where there

was a lack of demarcation between federal and state copyright powers).
148. 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
149. Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
150. 1 M. NuamER, supra note 20, § 1.O1B[2] [C], at 1-24 (emphasis added). Section

102(b) states that copyright protection does not "extend to any idea... regardless of
" 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1976).
the form in which it is described ..
151. Trade secret disclosures are often combinations of written and verbal disclosures. The latter are not protected by copyright law. A solution to this problem is
discussed later in this Article. See text accmpanying note 194 infra.
152. See text accompanying notes 76-111 supra.
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federal copyright protection may coexist under certain circumstances despite differences in theory. The purpose of trade secret
law is to encourage invention by preservation of commercial ethics
(to prevent unauthorized use and disclosure), 153 whereas the pur154
pose of patent law (and copyright law) is to encourage disclosure.
Kewanee did not address the issue of whether simultaneous use of
both trade secret and copyright protection would conflict unconstitutionally with copyright disclosure objectives.
B.

SIMULTANEOUS USE CONFLICTS WITH COPYRIGHT

DISCLOSURE POLICY

The Kewanee decision warned the states that if their systems of
protection created a substantial risk that users of the federal system
would be diverted to use of the state systems where there was
coregulation of the same subject matter, then such a state system
could not continue to exist. 155 In Kewanee, the Court essentially
held that trade secret protection of clearly patentable inventions did
not conflict with patent disclosure policy because very few inventors
would choose trade secret protection. 5 6 The patent protection
mechanism offers superior monopoly protection and forces inventors to make the election of protection quickly. Patent rights are1 for7
It
feited after one year of public use or after sale of the invention.
is impossible to use patent and trade secret protection simultaneafter a patent issues since its file is
ously. There is no secrecy
15 8
opened to the public.
In contrast, differences between the copyright and patent protection mechanisms allow potential simultaneous use of copyright
and trade secret protection because registration and deposit are not
preconditions to copyright creation. 1 9 An owner who has placed a
copyright notice on his computer program but who has delayed deposit could exploit his work as a trade secret, yet could effectively
fall back on the copyright protection provided since the moment of
153. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974).
154. Id. at 480.
155. Id. at 489. See text accompanying note 107 supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 106-108 supra.
157. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1972).
158. 37 C.F.R. § 1.11 (1978). The Eastern District of Wisconsin has ruled that recovery for improper use of a trade secret was limited to the time prior to issuance of a
patent based upon that secret. Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F.
Supp. 202 (E.D. Wis. 1969), affd sub nom., Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co.
452 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971).
159. Congress eliminated preregistration and deposit under the 1909 Act to prevent harsh forfeitures of copyright protection. See note 117 and accompanying text
supra.
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notice affixation. These tactics, at the very least, would delay copyright registration and deposit or, at the worst, would totally divert
owners from the use of the federal copyright system. Such diversion, however, is unconstitutional under Kewanee since it conflicts
with the federal disclosure policy inherent in the copyright law.
This potential diversion is best examined from the perspective
of a computer program owner who is contemplating which system of
protection to pursue for his secret work. The owner would be in the
best legal and financial position if he were allowed to exploit the
best parts of both trade secret protection and copyright protection
simultaneously. He could use both legal systems by affixing copyright notice to his program and other disclosed documents and by
subsequently exacting trade secret agreements from his licensees.
The advantage of using both systems becomes readily apparent
when compared to the weaknesses inherent in trade secret protection alone. The owner, when faced with the question of which form
of protection is in his best interests, might elect to pursue trade secret protection if he thought the ideas expressed in his program
could be exploited for a higher value than the coded expressions
themselves.
Whatever additional benefits that might accrue from exploitation as a trade secret instead of as a copyrighted work must be balanced with the weaknesses inherent in trade secret protection.
Trade secret protection only provides limited remedies for "leaked"
secrets. First, disclosure agreements may be unenforceable after
the secret becomes part of the general public knowledge 160 unless
contractual terms explicitly provide for enforcement after public dissemination. 161 Second, the trade secret owner cannot maintain a
misappropriation of trade secret cause of action against members of
the general public who use the secret once it enters the public domain. Third, if a disclosee or misappropriator of the secret releases
it to the general public, he may not have adequate resources to com160. See, e.g., Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D.
Wis. 1969), affd sub noma., Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621 (7th
Cir. 1971) (no trade secret damage recovery for misappropriation after patent issuance); Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir.
1949); Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651
(1942); Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1975). But see Shellmar
Prods. Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936) (permanent injunction not
dismissed after patent issuance).
161. Cf. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (state enforcement
of a contract provision providing for continuing royalty payments as consideration for
disclosure even if the invention was unpatentable did not conflict with federal patent

policy).
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pensate the owner for the value of the former trade secret. Fourth,
trade secret protection terminates at each jurisdiction's border.
As noted in Kewanee,162 these inherent weaknesses of trade secret protection would make almost all owners elect to choose
stronger federal copyright protection if they could not attempt to
use both systems simultaneously. Owners who elect federal protection, and who promptly register and deposit their works, further the
federal disclosure objectives. Of course, once a work is deposited it
no longer remains a secret and the ideas contained therein are not
protected.16 3 Some program owners will forego federal protection to
avoid disclosure. They have this right under Kewanee.
One may now examine the mechanics of the hypothetical owner's simultaneous use. Affixation of copyright notice effectively activates a federal copyright claim under both the 1909 and 1976 Acts.
Under the 1976 Act, copyright protection is activated by fixation of
the work into a tangible medium. 164 The copyright claim is perfected by deposit and registration of the work in the Copyright Office, 165 and all published copies of the work must bear copyright
notice. 166 Under the 1909 Act, a federal copyright claim was actinotice. 167 Hence,
vated by publication of the work with copyright 168
play.
into
that confusing issue of publication came
In the given hypothetical, there was a distribution of the computer program to a group of licensees. This distribution may have
constituted a publication that would invest copyright protection
under the 1909 Act. Under the investive publication doctrine of Hirschon v. United Artists Corp.,169 a greater level of publication is required to destroy a common law copyright than to invest a statutory
copyright.
It has been shown that trade secret and copyright law can over162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
37 C.F.R. § 201.2(b) (1980) (public inspection of deposited works).
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
Id. §§ 407, 408.
Id. § 401.
1909 Act, Pub. L. No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075.

168. Assuming that copyright notice placement antedated publication, then copyright protection under the 1909 Act would not relate back to the time of notice placement. Basevi v. Edward O'Toole Co., 26 F. Supp. 41, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). Absent
fraudulent intent, however, mere antedation of copyright notice does not invalidate a

copyright. Doyle, supra note 136, at 245 (citing Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888)
(pre-1909 Act law). See also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161
F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1946); Leigh v. Gerber, 86 F. Supp. 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
169. 243 F.2d 640, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1957). Other decisions have cited the doctrine in
dicta, but it has not been used as the basis of a ruling. See 1 M. NamMER, supra note

20, § 4.13 [C ], at 4-70, n.24 and cases cited therein.
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lap to protect the same material simultaneously. It will now be
demonstrated that simultaneous protection, or even the possibility
of simultaneous protection, unconstitutionally conflicts with the 1909
and 1976 Copyright Acts' disclosure policies.
State enforcement of trade secret agreements created after
copyright notice affixation on the disclosed copyrightable work will
encourage owners to delay or to avoid totally copyright registration
and deposit. The sole act of copyright notice affixation eliminates
the risks and weaknesses of trade secret protection. Elimination of
those common law deficiencies would encourage large numbers of
owners to elect trade secret protection and to avoid the registration
and deposit formalities of copyright. The stronger package of state
protection, and the likelihood of diversion from copyright registration and deposit requirements, will conflict with the federal disclosure objectives.
When initially faced with the election between copyright and
trade secret protection, an owner who places copyright notice on his
work does not fear the weaknesses inherent in trade secret protection. 170 If copies of the notice bearing work are somehow released to
the public, the owner can register and deposit his work. He will
have complied with all preconditions necessary to maintain a copyright infringement suit. 171 There would be no possibility of a forfeirights in the work should it be released
ture of intellectual property
172
to the public domain.
Public domain forfeiture is probably the greatest fear of all
trade secret owners. Affixation of copyright notice prevents public
dedication. If copies of the work bearing copyright notice are published generally, the owner can salvage federal protection by registration and deposit, even though he can no longer enforce his trade
federal protection
secret agreements. After registration and deposit,173
relates back to the moment of copyright creation.
Again, consider the inherent weaknesses of trade secret protec170. See text accompanying notes 160-61 supra.
171. Under the 1976 Act, copyright protection will relate back to fixation into a tangible medium. Distribution to licensees might constitute a 1909 Act investive publication. Protection then would relate back to the distribution. Assuming that the
distribution to licensees did not constitute an investive publication, then protection
would definitely relate back to the registration as an unpublished work.

172. Again, release of the work bearing notice would create federal copyright protection under the 1909 Act. Under the 1976 Act there is no forfeiture because protection accrues upon fixation of the work into a tangible medium. Copyright notice,
however, effectively bars the innocent infringement defense. 17 U.S.C. § 405(b)
(1976).
173. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 42 (1939). See 2 M. NiMMzR, supra note 20, § 7.16[A], at 7-113 to 7-114.
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tion. i7 4 First, licensees of a computer program would remain bound
by their use agreements after release of the work to the public domain. Unauthorized use of the program within the scope of copy175
right statutory rights would constitute copyright infringement.
Second, the owner could now sue any member of the public for infringement of copyright and recover damages. Third, the wrongful
misappropriators who released the work into the public domain are
not the sole source of compensation for unauthorized release and
free use of the work by members of the general public. The owners
may sue individual members of the general public for copyright infringement. Fourth, the owner now has national protection.
If, at their option, owners could use simultaneous protection,
they would be foolish to initially choose federal protection for proprietary material. They could exploit the sale of their ideas, as manifested by copyrightable works, under trade secret protection. No
deposit or registration would be necessary to enforce their trade secret agreements. If there were an unauthorized or accidental public
release of the work, the copyright notice would prevent public dedication of the work under the 1909 Act. After registration and deposit, federal protection would relate back to fixation into a tangible
medium 176 or to distribution of the work to licensees. 177 Thus, the
owner who uses both systems simultaneously places himself in a
strategic position for litigation.
The owner can litigate in state courts for trade secret misappropriation or in federal courts for copyright infringement at his whim.
He can argue that no publication occurred when the work was distributed to licensees if he wishes to pursue trade secret remedies as
a first line of protection. 7 8 Alternatively, he can argue that the dis179
tribution constituted an investive publication under the 1909 Act.
174. See text accompanying notes 160-61 supra.
175. See, 1909 Act, Pub. L No. 60-349, ch. 320, §§ 1, 25, 35 Stat. 1075; 17 U.S.C. §§ 106118, 501 (1976).

176. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
177. 1909 Act, Pub. L No. 60-349, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075. At the very least, protection would relate back to the time of unauthorized public release.
178. The advantage of a trade secret misappropriation action is preservation of secrecy. The misappropriator can be enjoined from use of the secret without any form
of deposit or registration. So long as secrecy is maintained, the owner can license
new licensees.
179. See note 177 supra. There is no investive publication problem under the 1976
Act. The owner may assert a copyright claim any time after fixation of the work into
a tangible medium so long as there was no public distribution that triggered the five
year relation back provision of section 405(a) (2). If disclosure to the licensees constituted a public distribution, the licensor would have five years to register his federal
claim.
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In the former action, the owner would argue that under the 1909 Act
the work was never copyrighted absent publication and that his sole
remedy was trade secret law. He would then cite Kewanee for the
proposition that an election of trade secret protection over federal
0
protection does not create a supremacy clause conflict.18
If the state court nevertheless ruled that an investive publication, or election of federal protection, had occurred, then the owner
simply could register and deposit his work. He could then argue
that federal protection attached at the time of distribution to the
misappropriators.1 8 1 The owner, therefore, could use effectively simultaneous copyright protection as a last resort to loss of trade secret protection or of 1909 Act common law copyright forfeiture.
Indeed, case law demonstrates that commercial organizations have
used simultaneous protection. These cases have involved both management information systems and data processing software systems.
In Management Science America, Inc. v. Cyborg Systems, Inc. ,182
the plaintiff licensed a computer payroll system to six hundred cus180. Under the 1976 Act, federal protection is created upon fixation, but the owner
would cite Kewanee in 1909 Act litigation.
181. Accord, Russell v. Price, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952
(1980) (held that the doctrine of laches would not bar a federal copyright infringement action where the plaintiffs previously denied the copyright nature of their
claims in state court). Plaintiff real party in interest was the sole licensed distributor
for a film adaptation of the play "Pygmalion." It commenced an unfair competition
action in California state court against a competitor and its officers who were also distributing the film. The defendants argued that the cause of action was really for federal copyright infringement and moved for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction. The
plaintiffs denied that they were pursuing a copyright infringement claim. The defendants prevailed.
After the state court dismissal, plaintiffs initiated an action for copyright infringement. The defendants argued that the doctrine of laches barred assertion of the
copyright claim. This argument was rejected by the district court and the plaintiffs
prevailed on the merits.
The Ninth Circuit held that the rejection of the laches defense was not an abuse
of discretion, since the defendants did not suffer any prejudicial detriment. Defendants had not changed their film distribution procedure in reliance on plaintiffs' conduct, and they were also apprised in the first action that the general nature of the
claim concerned unauthorized distribution of the film.
It is also a copyright infringement to appropriate another author's labors and
skills, as expressed in his copyrighted work, in order to produce a competing work
without the necessity to independently arrive at the same result. Orgel v. Clark
Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1962). A more recent district court case with
the same holding as Orgel was reversed and remanded by the Seventh Circuit.
25,278
Medeco Security Locks, Inc. v. Swiderek, [1981] COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
(N.D. Ill., Oct. 2, 1980), rev'd and remanded, No. 80-2784 (7th Cir., May 26, 1981) (plaintiff's copyrighted key cutting instruction codes were reorganized in defendant's competing instruction code book).
182. 6 CoMPUTR L. SERV. REP. 921 (N.D. MI 1978).
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tomers under trade secret agreements. Most of the system manuals
and documentation bore a copyright notice, but they were not registered or deposited. The defendants, former employees and their
corporation, moved for summary judgment on two grounds. First,
that as a matter of law, distribution of the manuals bearing copyright notice to the customers was a general publication that destroyed secrecy. Second, that distribution with notice invested
federal copyright protection under the 1909 Act and preempted trade
secret protection. 183 The district court denied summary judgment
because both bases hinged on whether the distribution was a general publication that destroyed secrecy and activated 1909 Act copyright protection. 1'
The defendants did not raise the issue of
supremacy clause conflict by simultaneous use of state and federal
protection.
Similarly, in Technicon Medical Information Systems Corp. v.
Green Bay Packaging,Inc. ,185 a software house commenced a trade
secret and common law copyright infringement action against its
former computer hardware supplier and some of its customers. The
defendants were bound by trade secret agreements. System reference manuals disclosing the trade secrets were distributed to customers. The manuals bore a copyright notice, but were not
registered or deposited pursuant to the 1909 Act. The defendants
contended that affixation of copyright notice estopped the plaintiff
from proceeding under a common law copyright claim and operated
as a general publication sufficient to defeat any claim of secrecy in
186
support of the trade secret claims.
The district court ruled that placement of copyright notice was
an election of federal over common law copyright protection and estopped the plaintiff from pursuing common law protection. 187 The
court refused to hold at the "summary judgment stage, that [placement of notice was] conclusive proof of publication so as to defeat
any claim of secrecy."1 88 As in MSA, the court was not presented
with the issue of supremacy clause conflict.
A third case, M. Bryce & Associates, Inc. v. Gladstone,18 9 was a
183. The opinion uses the term preemption in the sense of sole federal occupation
of the field after copyright activation.
184. 6 COMPUTER L SERv. REP. at 926.
185. 119811 COPYRIGHT L REP. (CCH) 25,255 (E.D. Wis., Sept. 9, 1980) (slip opinion), appeal docketed, No. 81-1469 (7th Cir., Mar. 6, 1981).
186. Id. at 16,465.
187. Id. at 16,467.
188. Id.
189. No. 432-975 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Milwaukee County) (all papers sealed by court order), appeal docketed, No. 80-1935 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
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suit for misappropriation of trade secrets involving a management
information system. The system was allegedly disclosed pursuant
to disclosure agreements. As in MSA and Technicon, system manuals bearing copyright notice were part of the disclosure. None of the
manuals was registered or deposited pursuant to the 1909 Act. The
defendants asserted that Wisconsin's courts lacked jurisdiction to
hear the controversy. They argued that as a matter of constitutional
law, state trade secret enforcement for disclosures occurring after
notice placement would conflict with or be preempted by the 1909
Act. The court denied motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
and a jury found for the plaintiff in December, 1979.
MSA, Technicon, and Bryce demonstrate that owners can and
will avoid deposit and registration of their works after placement of
copyright notice. All three plaintiffs pursued trade secret remedies
rather than federal copyright remedies, which require registration
and deposit. They avoided any possible forfeiture of their works by
affixation of copyright notice, yet the public has not received its quid
pro quo--disclosure.
Contrast the above cases with Kewanee. Kewanee Oil Company did not seek federal patent protection. It took a great risk that
a leak of its secret would dedicate its invention to the public domain
because it lacked patent protection. Furthermore, its patent rights
were forfeited after one year of public use. As the Court noted,
most inventors would examine the risks and benefits inherent in
both trade secret and patent law and choose patent protection. 190
Under the same scenario, the owner of a copyrightable secret might
decide to rely solely on trade secret protection without resort to any
of the steps necessary to procure federal copyright protection. In all
probability, few owners would risk public dedication under the 1909
Act or an innocent infringement defense under the 1976 Act. It
would not be unconstitutional if the owner initially chose to use
trade secret protection without resort to any copyright claim and
subsequently decided to abandon trade secret protection to pursue
copyright protection.
C.

SIMUULTANEOUS USE CONFLICTS wrrH COPYRIGHT NOTICE POLICY

The policies behind copyright notice are to inform the public
that federal copyright is claimed and to prevent innocent infringers
from incurring infringement penalties. As noted in Technicon, 19 1
copyright notice would be meaningless if owners could assert common law copyright claims after notice affixation and some degree of
190. 416 U.S. at 487.
191. [1981] COPYRIGHT L REP.

25,255, at 16,467.

1981]

FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAW SUPREMACY

distribution. The district court, however, was unwilling to hold that
copyright notice alone would be conclusive proof of publication that
destroys secrecy. 192
Given the court's analysis of the purpose behind notice, perhaps
it would have ruled that simultaneous use of trade secret protection
after notice affixation constituted an unconstitutional interference
with federal notice policy. The court had stated that notice informed the public that federal copyright was claimed. As a result of
that notice the public could assume that it was a valid assertion of
federal claims that would expire after a limited statutory term.
Upon expiration of the statutory term the public could assume that
it had free use of the work.
The court rightly stated that printed notices would become
meaningless unless the public could assume that they were valid.' 93
The availability of trade secret protection after notice affixation
would allow owners to assert a claim contrary to the claims implied
by the notice. The resulting public confusion would chill the flow of
public domain information and unconstitutionally interfere with
congressional notice policy.
Im.

SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS

Owners should avoid supremacy clause conflicts by using either
trade secret or copyright protection, but not both at any given time.
Copyrightable works protected by trade secret law should not bear a
copyright notice, but should bear a proprietary and confidentiality
notice. Copyrightable secrets created after, or not published before
January 1, 1978, do not need a copyright notice since they are automatically protected by the 1976 Act after fixation into a tangible medium. A warning such as "Unpublished-All Rights Reserved Under
the Copyright Laws" should negate any innocent infringement defense raised by an infringer. 194
It is more likely that copyright notice will be found on trade
secrets created prior to January 1, 1978, since owners were fearful of
secret and common law copyright forfeiture by general circulation.
The possibility of litigation from causes of action accruing prior to
192. Id.

193. Id.
194. The ABA Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law, Committee No.
206, at the recommendation of some of its members, suggested that such a legend
would negate an innocent infringement defense, while avoiding the simultaneous use
of copyright and trade secret protection. 1981 Proceedings and Committee Reports,
supra note 2, at 93.
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January 1, 1978 diminishes with the running of each state's trade secret misappropriation statute of limitations.
State courts that are entertaining trade secret causes of action
where copyrightable secrets bear copyright notice should dismiss
the actions on the condition that the defendant waive any statute of
limitations defense. The owner should register and deposit his work
in the Copyright Office and commence a copyright infringement
suit. The federal court could exercise pendent jurisdiction over misappropriated secrets that were not contained within the copyrighted
work.
Alternatively, or in the cases where defendants refuse to waive
statute of limitation defenses, owners could maintain trade secret
causes of action for ideas not expressed in the work bearing copyright notice. State courts must decline to exercise jurisdiction over
ideas and expressions contained in the work bearing copyright notice to avoid unconstitutional conflicts with federal copyright law.
Since the owner created the problem, he should have the burden to
prove which disclosures were not contained in the notice bearing
work.

